The Nuclear Differences Between Israel and Iran

Avner Cohen, whose research into Israeli nuclear weapons created quite an uproar and controversy in Israel a few years ago, has an interesting op-ed in Haaretz today. The piece, titled "Why Israel can and Iran Can't" in the Hebrew version, answers all those who claim the attitude towards Israeli and Iranian nukes represents a double standard. He also says Israel should let go of its nuclear ambiguity, so it can answer its critics. I'm not that sure about that part. Ambiguity has its pros and cons.

Here's the English version:

Time to come clean on the bomb
By Avner Cohen

Every time the subject of the Iranian nuclear issue comes up in international forums - as happened over the weekend when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decided to transfer the issue to the United Nations Security Council - there is someone who raises the issue of the exceptional Israeli nuclear issue. Every time Iran suffers condemnation for its nuclear conduct, its spokesmen accuse the Western world of a double standard: How is it that the West, according to them, turns a blind eye and permits Israel to develop nuclear weaponry whereas Iran - a country that only wants to realize its legitimate right to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes - is not left alone?

Among the Arab states as well, including those that truly do oppose and are afraid of the Iranian atom, this double standard argument also comes up. Why is the West dealing only with the Iranian atom and ignoring the Israeli atom, ask the Egyptians. Softer versions of this line of thinking are also common in Europe, where many argue that only anti-nuclear norms that apply to the entire region, including Israel, will prevent a nuclearized Middle East.

Even in the United States there are those who argue that only if Israel is brought into the Iranian equation in some way is there a chance of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. And indeed, the United States has made possible the introduction of a connection in this spirit, though softer and diluted, into the IAEA decision of this weekend, which also included a mention of the commitment to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

The attempt to put Israel and Iran on the same level, or even to create a concrete political connection between them, is ignorant, unfair and biased. First of all, from the point of view of international law: whereas Iran is a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and is committed to comply with it, Israel, like India and Pakistan, is not a signatory to the treaty and therefore is not beholden to a formal commitment. Whereas Iran has been caught in flagrant breach of its international commitments, Israel has not broken such commitments. In other words, like the seven other nuclear states in the world, and in stark contrast to Iran, Israel has never relinquished the right to develop nuclear weaponry.

However, beyond the formal plane there is a profound historical difference between Israel and Iran. Israel began its nuclear program in a world in which there were not yet explicit international norms against the possession of atomic weapons. When - according to foreign publications - Israel completed the first phase of the research and development of its nuclear activity around 1966, the NPT had not yet been completed. Had Israel decided at that time to realize its nuclear potential, and not to elect a policy of ambiguity, its nuclear status would be no different today from the status of the five other recognized nuclear states.

Beyond these differences there is also a profound difference between the two countries at the existential level. According to foreign reports, Israel began to develop its Samson option in the 1950s, while it was establishing a state for a people still in the shadow of conflagration, in a hostile geopolitical environment that was opposed to its very existence. It found itself committed to the creation of an insurance policy within the pre-1967 borders, without external guarantees for its existence. In the political climate of that time, a decade after the Holocaust, Israel had perhaps the strongest strategic and moral justification for turning to the nuclear option, certainly no less than France or China, which also began the atomic journey at that time.

Not only is Iran not under existential threat - its nuclear aspirations are an issue that puts it on a collision course with the world. Even the leaders of North Korea are not daring to declare their aspirations to wipe countries off the map, as the president of Iran has declared with respect to Israel.

From the Israeli perspective, it is essential not to leave the charge of double standard unanswered, but official Israel finds it difficult to answer the Iranian argument that it is permitted what Iran is forbidden. Official Israel finds it difficult to tell the world that its right to the atom is no less than that of France or India. The reason for this difficulty lies in the constraints of the policy of ambiguity that it has created of its own volition, a policy that traps it into not being able to clean up its nuclear position. Ambiguity is perceived in the world, with a certain amount of justice, as international deviation, as something sinful.

Israel's prime ministers have always refused to reopen the question of the exceptional nature of Israel's nuclear policy. The bureaucratic and diplomatic convenience of the ambiguity and the vast consensus behind its success have afforded Israeli prime ministers the luxury of not entering the atomic paradise. But the price of this exceptionalism is that the issue remains taboo, not arranged in an orderly manner, at home and abroad.

The need to deal with the Iranian nuclear capability strengthens the notion that the time has come for the state of Israel to find intelligent ways to clean up its nuclear status, at home and abroad.

Israel's nuclear policy was created as part of a chain of improvisations in the 1960s and the 1970s. But over the years the ambiguity has become a deviant anachronism, a kind of Israeli wink. Perhaps a fresh prime minister, who is open to innovative thinking, will be able to deal with the complex challenge of formulating a more transparent and democratic Israeli nuclear policy appropriate to the 21st century.

The writer, author of Israel and the Bomb and The Last Taboo, is a senior researcher at the University of Maryland.

Tags: Iran, Israel, Nuclear Weapons, WMD, Foreign Policy, International Affairs